By Michael O’Regan, Glasgow Caledonian University
Brexit didn’t just redraw political boundaries—it fundamentally transformed the geography of opportunity for young Europeans. Where once a young person from Manchester could seamlessly transition to working in a Barcelona café or interning at a Berlin startup, visa requirements and bureaucratic barriers have created what geographers might call “bordered mobility.” This shift from free movement to constrained, institutionally-mediated travel has particularly impacted young people, who historically relied on informal work-travel combinations to gain international experience and build the cross-cultural connections that strengthen European integration.
The ongoing discussions about a potential UK-EU Youth Mobility Scheme represent more than diplomatic negotiations. They signal a possible reconfiguration of geographic relationships that could reshape how young people experience Europe and the United Kingdom (UK) as both cultural space and labour market. However, our systematic analysis of youth mobility-Working Holiday Maker (WHM) schemes globally reveals success depends critically on understanding the complex interplay between policy design, participant motivations, and geographic contexts.
The post-Brexit mobility chasm
The European Commission’s April 2024 proposal for a youth mobility scheme emerged from a stark reality: the substantial reduction in mobility opportunities following Brexit. Their vision was ambitious—allowing 18-30 year-olds from both sides to live, work, study, or travel for up to four years, with provisions for equal university tuition fees and exemptions from the UK’s Immigration Health Surcharge.
Yet despite overwhelming public support (58% of UK citizens view such schemes positively, according to December 2024 polling), and endorsement from business groups and the Scottish Government, negotiations remain stalled. The barriers are not minor administrative differences—it’s politics, with fundamental disagreements about the purpose and scope of youth mobility in post-Brexit relations. Both proposals diverge significantly on duration (four years vs. one), quotas, and demands regarding healthcare charges and tuition fees. More broadly, the UK government’s unwavering commitment to reducing net migration and preventing any perceived “return to free movement” has created an impasse that reveals deeper tensions about post-Brexit identity and belonging.
| Feature | UK’s Existing Youth Mobility Scheme (YMS) and Proposed YMS scheme with the EU. | EU’s Proposed Youth Mobility Scheme (April 2024) |
| Age Eligibility | Generally 18-30 years old; 18-35 for citizens of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Korea. | 18-30 years old for both UK and EU citizens. |
| Maximum Duration of Stay | Typically, 2 years; 3 years for citizens of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. UK proposal EU reportingly 12 months. | Up to 4 years. |
| Quota System | Yes, annual caps are applied for each participating country. The UK reportedly proposed 70,000-80,000 annual cap for EU nationals. | Initial proposal stated mobility would not be subject to a quota system. |
| Healthcare Surcharge (IHS) | Required; usually £776 per year. | Proposed that the UK’s healthcare surcharge should not apply. |
| Higher Education Tuition Fees | EU students currently pay international fees in the UK post-Brexit. | Proposed equal treatment for UK and EU students, meaning EU students in the UK would pay domestic fees. |
The architecture of movement: how policy shapes geography
Visa conditions don’t simply facilitate movement—they actively construct different types of mobility experiences. Australia’s Working Holiday Maker scheme exemplifies how geographic requirements can channel participants into specific locations and labour markets. Mandatory regional work for visa extensions has created labour flows to remote areas but also generated exploitative conditions that contradict cultural exchange objectives.
The current UK YMS framework, operating with 13 non-EU countries, creates structured but limited mobility given it demands £2,530 in savings, a £319 application fee, and a £776 yearly health surcharge). Participants can work, study, or be self-employed, but cannot access public funds or bring dependents. Approximately 10% eventually obtain long-term UK residency, suggesting these schemes can function as migration pathways despite their temporary framing.
Current UK YMS schemes create “uneven mobilities,” with existing YMS partnerships revealing a geography of privilege, as agreements with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Japan reflect historical ties and similar economic development levels, while partnerships with countries like Uruguay or Taiwan remain small scale. India participates through a separate “Young Professionals Scheme” requiring degree-level qualifications, highlighting how educational requirements can create class-based exclusions.
The UK has previously discussed proposals for bilateral youth mobility deals from individual EU member states, with an alleged preference for bilateral arrangements with some EU states (e.g. France, Spain, Sweden) but not others (Bulgaria, Romania). This suggests the UK may view mobility from certain EU countries as more desirable than others, potentially reflecting problematic assumptions about different European nationalities.
Four pathways forward: scenario analysis
Our systematic analysis of 78 peer-reviewed studies on WHM schemes reveals a critical insight: successful programmes must navigate the false binary of viewing participants as either “working tourists” seeking cultural experiences or “travelling workers” pursuing economic opportunities. Research demonstrates that WHM participants exhibit “motivational fluidity”—shifting between cultural, professional, and economic objectives as circumstances evolve. The analysis suggests four potential scenarios for UK-EU youth mobility:
Traditional Cultural Exchange would prioritise cultural immersion through short-term programmes with high financial requirements and restricted work permissions. Flexible Multi-Country Mobility could embrace digital nomadism trends, allowing participants to move freely across the UK and EU member states to work remotely. Managed Skills Migration would channel participants toward sectors and regions experiencing shortages—perhaps hospitality in rural Scotland or agricultural work in peripheral EU regions. Comprehensive Integration Pathways represents the most ambitious scenario—offering routes to longer-term residency based on skills and integration achievements.
Toward geographic innovation: future solutions
While political resistance to perceived “free movement through the back door” continues to constrain possibilities, recent developments suggest the UK can be nudged towards a managed migration model that emphasizes youth rather than nationality-based hierarchies. The EU’s emphasis on youth mobility positions this as potentially foundational to a broader diplomatic “reset.” Such a deal might encompass educational cooperation frameworks like the Erasmus scheme, mutual recognition of qualifications and professional credentials, and reciprocal arrangements for touring artists, cultural exchanges, and research collaboration. A bespoke multi-tiered system could offer traditional cultural exchange pathways alongside skills-based routes (including potential extension into residency rights), with clear progression mechanisms between the two.
Success will require recognising youth mobility schemes as complex institutional frameworks shaping not just individual experiences but broader patterns of regional development, cultural exchange, and economic integration. This means designing systems that accommodate participants with varying motivations while ensuring geographic equity extends opportunities beyond metropolitan centres.
Conclusion: mapping future relationships
The stalled UK-EU youth mobility negotiations reveal fundamental tensions about post-Brexit geography—not just where borders lie, but how movement across them shapes identity, opportunity, and belonging. Geography offers tools for thinking beyond current impasses toward mobility frameworks serving both individual aspirations and collective challenges. Whether through innovative visa architectures or regional development incentives, the future of UK-EU youth mobility will ultimately be determined by how successfully policymakers can map new geographies of opportunity that serve the next generation of Europeans—on both sides of the Channel.
About the author: Michael O’Regan is a Lecturer in Tourism and Events for the Department of Fashion, Marketing, Tourism and Events at Glasgow Caledonian University.
Suggested further reading
Cranston, S. & Esson, J. (2024) Producing international students: Migration management and the making of population categories. The Geographical Journal. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1111/geoj.12582
Lee, J. et al. (2024) Citizens apart? Representing post-Brexit youth politics in the UK media. The Geographical Journal. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1111/geoj.12571
O’Regan, M., & Choe, J. (2025). Tourism futures and Working Holiday Maker schemes: a systematic review and scenario analysis. Journal of Tourism Futures, https://doi.org/10.1108/JTF-08-2024-0187
Prazeres, L. (2013). International and intra‐national student mobility: Trends, motivations and identity. Geography Compass. https://doi.org/10.1111/gec3.12080
Ralph, D., & Staeheli, L. A. (2011). Home and migration: Mobilities, belongings and identities. Geography Compass. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-8198.2011.00434.x
How to cite
O’Regan, M. (2025, September) Remapping youth mobility and Working Holiday Maker schemes: geographic lessons for UK-EU relations post-Brexit. Geography Directions. https://doi.org/10.55203/UAGN2494
Geography Directions 